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Lovitt v. Warden
585 S.E.2d 801 (Va. 2003)
L Facts
Early in the morning on November 18, 1998, Robin M. Lovitt ("Lovitt')
stabbed Clayton Dicks ('Dicks") repeatedlyand robbed Champion Billiards Hall
where Dicks worked the late-night shift.' A jury convicted Lovitt and returned
a death verdict against him for the capital murder of Dicks "in the commission
of robbery, in violation of [Virginia] Code S 18.2- 31, and [the jury also convicted
Lovitt] of robbery, in violation of [Virginia] Code S 18.2-58."2 The Supreme
Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction and sentence.' Pursuant to section
8.01-654, Lovitt filed a habeas petition. In his petition, Lovitt asserted, in part,
that his trial counsel were ineffective, "that the prosecution suppressed exculpa-
tory evidence in violation of Brady v Marar"" and that his due process rights
were impinged when trial exhibits were destroyed "preventing adequate review
of his habeas corpus petition."6 Under order from the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia, the circuit court conducted a habeas hearing and produced a report con-
taining "its findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law."7
1. Lovittv. Warden, 585 SE.2d 801,805-08 (Va. 2003) (quoting Lovittv. Commonwealth,
537 S.E2d 866, 870-73 (Va. 2000)).
2. L ot 585 S.E.2d at 805; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Mlchie Supp. 2003) (defining the
offenses that constitute capital murder); VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-58 (vfichie 1996) (defining the
punishment for robbery.
3. Laiu 537 S.E.2d at 881, wtdaiat 534 U.S. 815 (2001);seealsoMatthewS. Nichols, Case
Note, 13 CAP. DEF.J. 435 (2001) (analyzing Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 866 (Va. 2000)).
4. Lo*t 585 S.E2d at 805; sw VA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-654 (Michie 2000) (outlining the
procedures and qualifications for obtaining a writ of habeas corpus).
5. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
6. Lo i 585 S.E.2d at 805; sw Bradyv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that due
process violations occur when the prosecution withholds, upon request, evidence favorable to the
accused that is material to guilt or innocence, regardless of whether the prosecution acted in good
or bad faith).
7. Lott, 585 S.E.2d at 805; sm VA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-654(Q (requiring the circuit court
to conduct a hearing and "report its findings of fact and recommend conclusions of law to the
Supreme Court [of Virginia]" when a petitioner is held under a sentence of death if directed to do
so by the Supreme Court of Virginia).
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A. Habeas Haing Teszvny
1. II0'ffweAssistanxe Co md
During the habeas proceeding, several members of Lovitt's familytestified
regarding his family history and background.8 Additionally, Lovitt's trial counsel
testified about their trial strategy during both the guilt and sentencing phases .'
Counsel testified that they were concerned about the jury's reaction to Lovitt's
familysituation and determined that "the jurycould conclude that Lovitt's family
background increased his future danger to society.""m The decision not to
introduce evidence of Lovitt's family history, according to the lower court, was
strategic. 11 Further, counsel testified that they made a strategic decision "not to
pursue additional DNA testing of the bloody scissors and Lovitt's jacket[ ]
[which allowed them] to argue that an unknown assailant killed Dicks."' 2 The
circuit court found that, during the penalty phase, the defense team's tactic was
to "humanize" Lovitt by illustrating he was no longer a danger.13 The circuit
court noted that trial counsel had within their control many of Lovitt's criminal
and medical records as well as the pre-sentence report." Additionally, Lovitt
never told his counsel that he suffered "sexual or physical abuse by his stepfa-
ther."15
2. Brady Ciim
a. Dr Pierr-L as
Dr. Marie-Lydie Y. Pierre-Louis ("Dr. Pierre-Louis"), a medical examiner,
performed Clayton Dicks's autopsy.6 She examined two pairs of scissors while
performing the autopsy and concluded that neither pair inflicted the wounds that
caused Dicks's death.17 Dr. Pierre-Louis told a colleague "that she would have
to examine the bloody scissors [(a third pair of scissors)] before she could reach
a conclusion [as to] whether those scissors were the source of Dicksls]
wounds." 8 Dr. Pierre-Louis's statements regarding the first two pairs of scissors,
8. Loutt, 585 S.E.2d at 813. TestimonybyLovitt's familymembers generallyconcentrated
on the abusive relationship between Lovitt and his stepfather. Id at 824.
9. Id at 813.
10. Id Testimony concerning Lovitt's alcohol and drug abuse was offered that had the
potential of being viewed by the jury as either aggravating or mitigating evidence. Id at 824-25.
11. Id at 814.
12. Id at 813.
13. Idat814.
14. La*i, 585 S.E.2d at 814.
15. Id





those that she examined, and her comments that those scissors could not have
caused Dicks's death, did not appear in the autopsy report. 9 Lovitt claimed that
Dr. Pierre-Louis's statement regarding the scissors she examined was exculpatory
and should have been disclosed." The circuit court found that once DNA
results confirmed "Dicksls] blood on the bloody scissors," Dr. Pierre-Louis
acknowledged that she was incorrect.2 Additionally, the circuit court found that
Lovitt's trial counsel had full "access to the bloodyscissors, the autopsyreport,
and to Dr. Pierre-Louis prior to Lovitt's trial."22
b. CzdLucas
i Prior Cooperatin uith A zboriti5
While incarcerated, Lovitt was housed in the same unit as Casel Lucas
("Lucas").23 Over the two months they lived together, the two became close
friends.24 Lucas provided statements to police to be used in connection with
Lovitt's trial.25 These statements recounted the events of November 18, 1998 as
Lovitt had told them to Lucas.26 Before trial, the Commonwealth provided
Lovitt's trial counsel with Casel Lucas's criminal record, but the Commonwealth
did not disclose "that Lucas had provided information to various police depart-
ments in four previous criminal cases."" As appreciation for the aid he provided
in a prior criminal trial, Lucas had received a reduction in his sentence for a
pending criminal offense.2" The circuit court found at the habeas proceeding that
the prosecution did not inform Lovitt's counsel, nor did Lovitt's trial counsel
know, that Lucas had participated in other cases by providing information.29
zi Prior Iolnmssrn S tatwrw
At the habeas hearing, Lovitt's habeas counsel presented the court with a
handwritten affidavit signed byLucas. 0 The affidavit contained statements that
conflicted with Lucas's trial testimony.3' At the habeas hearing, Lucas testified
19. Id
20. Lo*t 585 S.E.2d at 817.
21. Id at 811.
22. Id
23. Lo, 537 S.E.2d at 872.
24. Id
25. Lout, 585 S.E.2d at 812.
26. Lozia, 537 S.E.2d at 872.
27. Lo, 585 S.E.2d at 811-12.
28. Id
29. Id at 812.
30. Id
31. Id The affidavit stated, among other things, that Lucas received a reduced sentence in
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that he did not thoroughly read the affidavit he signed.2 "Additionally, Lucas
stated that Lovitt was his sole source of information concerning the testimony
he gave at Lovitt's trial."" "The circuit court found that Lucas had 'disavowed'
the affidavit written by Lovitt's habeas counsel," and that Lucas did not make
statements prior to Lovitt's trial "that were inconsistent with his trial testi-
mony."
34
3. Destictim cfE vien
Testimonyduring the habeas proceeding revealed that an order was drafted
for the destruction of Lovitt's trial exhibits in April 2001 bythe Circuit Court of
Arlington County Chief Deputy Clerk, Robert C McCarthy ("McCarthy').
McCarthy testified that he received "a mandate from [the Supreme] Court [of
Virginia] indicating that Lovitt's convictions were affirmed" and interpreted this
statement to be authorization to destroy the exhibits. 6 McCarthy, without
consulting anyone, "drafted the evidence destruction order."3" The circuit court
found that the destruction order was drafted before the effective date of sections
19.2-270.4:1 and 19.2-327.1 of the Virginia Code." McCarthy delivered the
destruction order along with "15 and 20 other such orders, to the chambers of
Judge Paul F. Sheridan" where they were subsequently entered..9 The trial
exhibits were destroyed shortly thereafter."
Two deputy clerks testified at the hearing that theywarned McCarthy, who
was their immediate supervisor, that Lovitt's evidence should not be destroyed.4"
Both testified that McCarthyresponded that because Lovitt's appeals had ended,
exchange for his cooperation in another criminal case, and that he learned what he knew regarding
Dicks's murder from the television show "Crime Stoppers." Id at 813. Lucas signed his initials
next to everyparagraph of the affidavit at habeas counsel's request. Id
32. Id at 813. Lucas also testified that he had a tooth extracted that dayand did not feelwell
during the three-hour interview. Ue
33. Loi 585 S.E.2d at 813.
34. id
35. Id at 808.
36. Id
37. Id at 809. The circuit court noted that McCarthy did not consult the Commonwealth
Artomey's office, the Arlington Police, the circuit court, or Lovitt's trial or habeas counsel Id
38. Id; smVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-270.4:1 (Michie Supp. 2003) (outlining the procedures for
the storage of biologicalevidence in felonycases); VA. CODE ANN. S19.2-327.1 (Michie Supp. 2003)
(stating the procedures that convicted felons need to utilize to have scientific analysis performed
on newly discovered or previously untested evidence).
39. Loi#, 585 S.E.2d at 809.
40. Id
41. Id Both deputies testified that they warned McCarthy because the case was a "capital
case" and Lovitt had not been executed. Id
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the evidence could be destroyed. 2 McCarthy testified that in drafting the de-
struction order he relied on the mandate from the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirming Lovitt's conviction and did not review Lovitt's file himself.43 "He
further testified that at the time the destruction order was entered, he was not
aware of any change in the law concerning the preservation of human biological
evidence."" The circuit court found no signs of bad faith "with the intent to
destroy exculpatory evidence" on the part of any official with the Common-
wealth." Further, the circuit court's findings indicated that McCarthytruthfully
believed he was acting within his power in destroying Lovitt's trial evidence after
receiving the mandate from the Supreme Court of Virginia.'
II Hdding
The Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed Lovitt's habeas petition.47 The
court concluded that: (1) Lovitt's trial counsel were not ineffective; and (2)
"Lovitt's Brady claim [was] without merit."" Additionally, "Lovitt ... failed to
advance any valid basis for habeas corpus relief arising from the destruction of
the trial exhibits in his case."49
III A m4lis
A. IrJaiwAssistane jCa Od
Lovitt asserted that his trial counsel were ineffective in both the guilt and
penalty phases of his trial." With respect to the guilt phase of his trial, Lovitt
argued, in part, that his trial counsel were ineffective because they. (1) failed "to
have additional DNA tests performed on the bloody scissors and the jacket that
he wore when he was arrested"; (2) "failed to conduct a reasonable investigation
of the alleged murder weapon"; (3) did not fullyinvestigate Lucas; and (4) "failed
to request a juryinstruction on the credibility of 'jailhouse informants.'", With
respect to the penalty phase, Lovitt contended that his counsel were ineffective




45. Loi 585 S.E2d at 809.
46. Id at810.
47. Id at 827.
48. Id at 817, 819.
49. Id at 817.
50. Id at 819.
51. Lo* 585 S.E.2d at 819.
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contended, could have influenced their decision not to introduce "extensive
mitigation evidence to the jury." 2
In response to Lovitt's assertions, the Warden argued that Lovitt's trial
counsel were effective and the choices theymade in the presentation of their case
were part of a deliberate trial strategy." Counsel's decisions were calculated to
illustrate to the jury the weakness in the prosecution's case, namely that DNA
evidence did not conclusively link Lovitt to the murder.54 Further, the Warden
argued that Lovitt's trial counsel were sufficientlyacquainted with Lovitt's family
situation and reasonably decided not to introduce evidence of Lovitt's family
circumstances during the penalty phase because the jury could have used that
testimony to support the contention that he was a future danger."
"A defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment includes the
right to effective assistance of counsel ' 6 According to the two-part test an-
nounced in Stridlandv Washiin 7 a petitioner claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel ("IAC')must prove both that " 'counsel's representation feU below
an objective standard of reasonableness' " and that " 'there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different."' Courts are not required to find counsel
deficient in order to dispose of IAC claims; if it is easier, they are free to dispose
of claims on the ground that there is a lack of sufficient prejudice.59 "The




56. Id (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,685-86 (1984));seU.S.CoNST. amend.
VI ("In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoythe right to... have the assistance of counsel
for his defence."); StDcla' 466 U.S. at 685-86 (discussing that "the right to counsel is the right
to the effective assistance of counsel" (internal quotation marks omitted)); se a/so Roe v. Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (extending the Sti&lard test "to claims ... that counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal"); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648,654 (1984) (stating that "[i)f no actual'Assistance' 'for' the accused's 'defence' is provided, then
the constitutional guarantee has been violated"); Sheikh v. Buckingham Corr. Ctr., 570 S.E.2d 785,
788-89 (Va. 2002) (illustrating a Strdand application to counsel's failure to present mitigating
evidence at sentencing.
57. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
58. Louu, 585 S.E.2d at 820-21 (quoting Stnkkeaz4 466 US. at 687-88, 694); swWiggins v.
Smith, 123 S. CQ. 2527, 2535 (2003) (endorsing the Stri/ani test for claims that counsel was
ineffective in failing to pursue mitigating evidence); Bellv. Cone, 535 U.S. 685,695 (2002) (applying
the SideLavd test to petitioner's "claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at [his]
sentencing hearing"); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000) (applying the StridLand test to
Wlliam's contention "that he was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to the effective
assistance of counsel when his trial lawyers failed to investigate and to present substantial mitigating
evidence to the sentencing jury").
59. L oia 585 S.E.2d at 82 1; seeHedrickv. Warden, 570 S.E.2d 840,847 (Va. 2002) (explain-
ing that it is easier to dispose of IAC claims based on lack of sufficient prejudice). SeegarrlyPiya
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reviewing court must make its prejudice determination byconsidering the totality
of evidence before the trier of fact."6" When examining a habeas corpus petition,
courts afford" 'a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.'" 6
First, the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Lovitt's claim that his trial
counsel fell below a reasonable standard when theyfailed to request DNA testing
on the bloody scissors and jacket.62 The court concluded that based on the
findings of the circuit court, counsel's trial strategy meant to "underscore[ ] the
alleged deficiency in the Commonwealth's proof while avoiding the possibility
that further testing of the scissors and jacket would yield results further implicat-
ing Lovitt in the murder." 63  Therefore, the court found that trial counsel's
performance was not objectively unreasonable. 4
The Supreme Court of Virginia found no merit in the contention that
Lovitt's counsel was ineffective for not pursuing a more extensive investigation
on the murder weapon.6 The circuit court found that trial counsel did consult
a forensic expert and did investigate whether the bloody scissors could have
caused Dick's injuries.6 Due to the circuit court's findings, the Supreme Court
of Virginia found trial counsel's performance reasonable with respect to this
clai 
6 7
The court then addressed Lovitt's argument that his trial counsel were
ineffective for not requesting a continuance to investigate Lucas further after
learning he would be a witness for the Commonwealth."8 The court found no
merit to this assertion because trial counsel investigated Lucas and obtained
significant impeachment evidence.69 "Given this extensive impeachment evi-
dence obtained ... trial counsel's investigation of Lucas constituted an objec-
tively reasonable exercise of professional judgment .... 70
Nath, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 479 (2003) (analyzing Hedrick v. Warden, 570 SE.2d 840 (Va.
2002)).
60. Lo, 585 S.E2d at 821 (citing Srk&aAn, 466 US. at 695).
61. Id at 820 (quoting StrkLnri, 466 U.S. at 689).
62. 1d at 822.
63. Id; see Strikla4 466 U.S. at 687-88 (stating that in order for trial counsel to be ineffec-
tive under the first prong of Strkl/an, counsels performance must fall below an objective reason-
ableness standard).
64. Loit 585 S.E.2d at 822.
65. Id at 821.
66. Id
67. Id
68. Id at 822.
69. Id
70. Lotitt, 585 S.E.2d at 822;seStrid/an4 466 US. at 687-88 (stating counsel's performance
will be held adequate if "objectively reasonable"); sealso WVgox, 123 S. Q. at 2535 (stating that the
Court gives deference to trial strategyand judgments "in terms of the adequacyof the investigations
2004]
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The Supreme Court of Virginia also dismissed Lovitt's claim that his
counsel were "ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction regarding the
'credibilityof jailhouse informants.'" 7 Citing an Oklahoma case, Lovitt argued
that the jury should have been instructed that the testimony of Lucas, as an
informant, must be weighed more carefullythan the testimonyof an "ordinary"
witness .72 The Supreme Court of Virginia held that this argument was "without
merit because the law of this Commonwealth does not require a fact finder to
give different consideration to the testimony of a government informant than to
the testimony of other witnesses.""
Next, the Supreme Court of Virginia examined Lovitt's claim that his trial
counsel were ineffective during the penalty phase of the trial due to their failure
to investigate fully and present mitigation in light of the United States Supreme
Court's recent decisions in Wim v Snidi4 and Wdlian v Taglor."5 Lovitt
contended that trial counsel's failure to investigate extensively his family history
and social background, which contained evidence of sexual and drug abuse, fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.76 Using Strikani as a guide, the
Supreme Court of Virginia first examined "whether Lovitt suffered prejudice
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of his sentencing."7 Distin-
guishing Lovitt's case from the facts in Wzinrz, the court stated that "[u]nlike the
record in Wigin, the record from Lovitt's trial show[ed] that counsel presented
some recent personal history as mitigation evidence at the penalty phase of the
trial.""8 Additionally, the court noted that Lovitt's counsel did present some
supporting those judgments").
71. Lotitz, 585 S.E.2d at 822. Segmvnal=yC Blaine Elliott, L *'s Urwainjz: Howto Dad uith
Corenim Wmes andJailtwe Snitd, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 1 (2003) (offering remedies and reforms
in the area of cooperating witness testimony and how to handle jailhouse informants).
72. Lo*t, 585 S.E.2d at 822; see Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000)
(adopting "a procedure to ensure complete disclosure so that counsel will be prepared to cross-
examine an informant-witness").
73. Lo*r, 585 S.E.2d at 822.
74. 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003).
75. Lo*z 585 S.E.2d at 822; se Vwin, 123 S. Ct. at 2541-42 (holding that "[ciounsers
investigation into Wgginsis] background did not reflect reasonable professional judgment");
Wid,ian, 529 U.S. at 396, 399 (finding prejudice where counsel failed to fulfill their obligation to
investigate completelytheir client's background). Seegeoufly Terrence T. Egland, Case Note, 16
CAP. DEF. J. 101 (2003) (analyzing Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. C. 2527 (2003)).
76. Loa4 585 S.E.2d at 822.
77. Id; see Stridklanr 466 U.S. at 694 ("The defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome."); se also W& inv, 123 S. Ct. at 2541-42 (holding that "[c]ounsel's investigation into
W'gginsls] background did not reflect reasonable professional judgment").
78. Loit 585 S.E.2d at 823; see Wiirs, 123 S. C. at 2532-33 (describing Wiggins's trial
counsel's failure to compile a social history report and their attempt to" 'retry[ ]the factual case'"
(Vol. 16:2
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family history during the penalty phase "through the testimony of Lamanda
Jones, Lovitt's stepsister."' Evidence presented at the habeas hearing illustrated
that most of Lovitt's family members made general comments with respect to
abuse directed at Lovitt by his stepfather but offered few specific instances of
abuse."0 By examining the records introduced at the habeas hearing, the court
concluded that a jury could view the records as "either evidence in aggravation
or in mitigation of the offense.""1
In reviewing the prejudice claim, the court must" 'reweigh the evidence in
aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence.' "82 The court
stated that the evidence in aggravation included the brutality of the attack,
Lovitt's past criminal history, Lovitt's discipline problems while incarcerated, and
the fact that he was on parole when he murdered Dicks.3 The court stated that
evidence in mitigation included Lovitt's home life, his stepfather's alcoholism and
abuse, and Lovitt's aid and protection of his siblings from their abusive father
figure. 4 With respect to the evidence of Lovitt's drug abuse, antisocial disorder,
juvenile and other records, the court concluded that this evidence could be
coined" 'double edge.' "8" Noting that there was no evidence that Lovitt was
mentally evaluated, the court stated that there was "a failure of proof regarding
Lovitt's contention that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to present
extensive evidence of his familyand social history at the penaltyphase proceed-
ing." 6 The court concluded "that Lovitt... failed to demonstrate that his
defense was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to investigate and present the
available mitigation evidence.""
of Wiggins's trial during sentencing to the exclusion of presenting mitigating evidence).
79. Lou 585 S.E.2d at 823. Lamanda Jones testified that Lovitt helped raise his brothers
and sisters and stated that due to her stepfather's alcoholism, he was not allowed to be around the
children most of the time. Id
80. Id at 824.
81. Id The court gave the ea le that Lovitt's medical records showed he "had an
antisocial personality disorder and 'polysubstance' dependence." Id Records showed that Lovitt
began drinking at the age of five and began to use marijuana at eight. Id Additionally, the court
noted that his juvenile records showed a lack of remorse for crimes he committedas well as
evidence from caseworkers that his family environment was stable. Id
82. Id at 824-25 (quoting Wzs, 123 S. Ct. at 2542); see also M'/ims, 529 US. at 397-98
(stating that a judgment of IAC must rest on the "totality of the omitted evidence rather than on
the notion that a single item of omitted evidence, no matter how trivial, would require a new
hearing").
83. Lort, 585 S.E.2d at 825.
84. Id
85. Id (quoting W'iro, 123 S. Ct. at 2542).
86. Id
87. Id The court noted that its decision was "not altered by the Supreme Court's decision
in Wdlianr." Id at 826. The court stated that the evidence in Lovitt's case did not "raise the same
concerns that the Supreme Court in Wiliara held 'might well have influenced the jurys appraisal
2004]
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Lovitt next claimed that the circuit court judge who presided over the
habeas hearing improperlyexcluded several affidavits fromLovitt's family.88 The
court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in keeping out the
affidavits and further dismissed Lovitt's argument that the affidavits would have
been admissible in the penaltyphase and therefore should have been admitted
into evidence during the habeas hearing.89 The court noted that "Virginia does
not permit the admission of such hearsay evidence during the penalty phase
proceeding."'
Finally, the court addressed Lovitt's contention that he is actuallyinnocent.9"
The court concluded that innocence is an issue decided by a jury and that this
claim did not properly fall within the writ of habeas corpus review "which
concerns only the legality of the petitioner's detention."'92 Finding the claim
improperly asserted, the court dismissed the claim.93
B. Brady (an
Lovitt asserted that statements made by Dr. Pierre-Louis concerning the
scissors she examined were exculpatory and that the Commonwealth's failure to
disclose those statements resulted in a Brady violation.94 Additionally, Lovitt
contended that the Commonwealth's failure to disclose "evidence of Lucas'[s]
allegedly inconsistent prior statements and his cooperation with different law
enforcement authorities" was a Bradyviolation because that information "could
of [the petitioner's] moral culpability.'" Id (alteration in original (quoting Wd'n, 529 U.S. at
398); se Wdlia/m, 529 U.S. at 398 ('Mitigating evidence unrelated to dangerousness may alter the
jury's selection of penalty, even if it does not undermine or rebut the prosecution's death-eligibility
case.").
88. Lo*i 585 S.E.2d at 826. The court assumed without deciding that affidavits sought to
be admitted in a habeas proceeding under section 8.01-654(q of the Virginia Code are admissible
subject to the trial court's discretion. Id Under such an assumption, the court found that the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion. Id
89. Id
90. Id; see VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-264.4(B) (Michie Supp. 2003) (stating the procedures for
a sentencing proceeding in a capital case).
91. Lo*t, 585 S.E.2d at 826-27.
92. Id at 827; seeVirginia Parole Bd. v. Wilkins, 498 S.E.2d 695,696 (Va. 1998) (stating "[t]he
writ [of habeas corpus] is available only where the release of the prisoner from his immediate
detention will follow as a result of an order in his favor" (internal quotation marks omitted));
Mcaenny v. Murray, 431 S.E.2d 330, 331 (Va. 1993) (stating that "the scope of the inquiry (in a
habeas proceeding] is limited to the propriety of the prisoner's present detention, that is, whether
his detention is by due process of law" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
93. Lomt, 585 S.E.2d at 827.
94. Id at 817; see Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (holding that due process violations occur when the
prosecution withholds favorable evidence that has been requested by the defense and that is
material to guilt or innocence, regardless of whether the prosecution acted in good or bad faith).
[Vol. 16:2
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have been used to attack Lucasis] credibility at trial."95 In response to these
assertions, the Warden argued that Dr. Pierre-Louis's statements were not
exculpatory." Further, the Warden argued that the Commonwealth cannot be
required to disclose cooperative witness information when the Commonwealth
did not know that the witness cooperated in a different trial at the time of the
trial in question."'
When analyzing a claim that exculpatory evidence is material, the inquiry is
whether "the proceeding would have resulted in a different outcome had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense.""8 Additionally, "Brady disclosure
requirements extend to information that can be used to impeach a witnessis]
credibility."99 Under the requisite due process analysis, the court is to consider
"on an item-by-item basis whether the evidence at issue was exculpatory."1"
When considering undisclosed exculpatoryevidence and evaluating its materiality,
this determination must be based on the evidence's cumulative effect. 1 1
The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that Dr. Pierre-Louis's comment
regarding those scissors that were available while she performed the autopsywas
not exculpatoryevidence because the scissors she commented on were not those
presented into evidence. 2 Additionally, because she changed her position
before trial, her first opinion was not exculpatory.' 3 The court concluded that
the Commonwealth was not required to disclose to Lovitt's trial counsel any
information regarding her initial opinion. 4
Turning to Lucas, the court stated that the Commonwealth was required to
provide Lovitt's defense team with information regarding Lucas's cooperation
95. Loiz 585 S.E.2d at 817.
96. Id
97. Id
98. Id (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999)); sw Strid1er, 527 U.S. at 280
(stating that the duty to disclose evidence encompasses both exculpatory and impeachment
evidence); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (outlining three types of situations in which
a Brady claim could arise).
99. L outt, 585 S.E.2d at 817 (citing StrkLer, 527 U.S. at 282 n.21). A due process violation
can only occur in the context of suppression of impeachment evidence when a prosecutor sup-
presses impeachment evidence and this suppression "deprives the defendant of a fair trialunderthe
Bradystandard of materiality." Id at 818 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985)).
100. Id at 818 (citing K15, 514 U.S. at 436 n.10).
101. Id (citing K*, 514 U.S. at 436 n.10).
102. Id
103. Id The circuit court's factual findings, bolstered by Detective Chase's testimony,
confirmed that Dr. Pierre-Louis changed her opinion before trial commenced. Id
104. Id Because Dr. Pierre-Louis's testimonywas not exculpatorythe court was not required
to consider its materiality. Id The court, however, determined that the statements would not have
undermined the court's confidence in the jury's verdict. Id
2004]
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in the Evans prosecution because Lucas received a benefit for this testimony.'
However, because Lucas did not receive a benefit for his testimony in other
prosecutions, that testimony did not constitute impeachment evidence and was
not required to be disclosed by the Commonwealth.' Further, Lovitt argued
that Lucas's inconsistent statements should have been disclosed."7 However,
because the circuit court, during the habeas hearing, found that such inconsistent
statements did not exist, the court concluded that Lovitt failed to demonstrate
that the Commonwealth inappropriately withheld statements made by Lucas
prior to Lovitt's trial."0 '
Because the Commonwealth did not disclose the impeachment evidence
regarding Lucas and his involvement in the Evans case, the court examined the
Bradyeffect with respect to this item. 1'9 The court concluded that the Common-
wealth's failure to disclose this information did not undermine the court's
confidence in the jury's ultimate verdict."' As a result, the Supreme Court of
Virginia determined that "Lovitt's Brady claim [was] without merit.""'
C DesmacimcfEtidew
"Lovitt argue[d] that McCarthy, an agent of the Commonwealth, procured
the destruction of the trial exhibits in bad faith, and that the destruction of this
evidence violated [Lovitt's] right of due process bypreventing meaningful review
of his habeas corpus petition.""' Lovitt argued that the destruction of the trial
evidence was untimely and that in death penaltycases DNA evidence cannot be
destroyed until the death sentence is executed." 3 From these arguments Lovitt
105. Loua, 585 S.E2d at 818-19. The Evans prosecution was a previous trial at which Lucas
gave testimony and received a benefit in return. Id; see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,
154-55 (1972) (stating that if a govenment witness receives a benefit in the form of a disposition
of a criminal charge pending against him in return for testimony, this fact can be used as impeach-
ment evidence and failure to disclose this detail could violate the accused's due process rights).
106. L o* 585 S.E.2d at 819; see Collier v. Davis, 301 F.3d 843, 849 (7th Cr. 2002) (stating
that without an agreement or understanding between the prosecution and a witness that the
witness's testimony is in exchange for leniency, the defense could not establish a Brady violation).
107. Loit, 585 S.E.2d at 819.
108. Id
109. Id
110. Id; swStnit/eer, 527 U.S. at 289 (stating that in order to obtain relief, the petitioner must
show a reasonable probability that the trial would have come out differently "if the suppressed
documents had been disclosed to the defense").
111. L*ut, 585 S.E.2d at 819.
112. Id at 814.
113. Id Lovitt relied on sections 19.2-270.4 and 19.2-270.4:1 of the Virginia Code when
making his assertions regarding the proper timing for evidence destruction. Id; seeVA. CODE ANN.
§19.2-270.4 (Michie Supp. 2003) (stating when destruction of exhibits is authorized); VA. CODE
ANN. §19.2-270.4:1 (Michie Supp. 2003) (stating the procedures for storage and retention of
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asserted that the death penalty could not be an appropriate punishment because
evidence material to his case was destroyed."'
Addressing Lovitt's due process claim, the court pointed to the fact that the
United States Supreme Court has never held that habeas relief is the proper way
to contest the inability further to test DNA- Because no direct authorityexists,
Lovitt relied onA nzown u Y r qJd 1bP' 6 and Gda/ 7zoav Trmniea" to support his
contentions.' In those cases, the United States Supreme Court "considered due
process claims involving the pre-trial destruction of evidence."" 9 In Yaqgblod,
the Supreme Court recognized a distinction between failing to disclose extant
exculpatory evidence and failing to preserve potentiallyexonerating evidence. 20
The Court held "that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part
of the police, failure to preserve ?otentially useful evidence does not constitute
a denial of due process of law."' 2 Because a major focus of a criminal trial is to
allow the accused to see the evidence and confront the charges brought against
him, having a materiality policypre-trial reflects the underlying goal of "funda-
mental fairness."' 22
The purpose in a habeas corpus proceeding is to ensure that the petitioner's
detention is legal and not in violation of any constitutional rights.' The Su-
preme Court of Virginia acknowledged that the "different focus raises the issue
[of] whether a due process right maybe asserted in a habeas corpus proceeding
to challenge the post-trial destruction of evidence."' 24 Assuming that Lovitt
biological evidence in felony cases).
114. Lnti, 585 S.E2d at 814.
115. Id "Tuhe United States Supreme Court has not addressed the question whether due
process rights maybe asserted against the post-trial destruction of evidence." Id
116. 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
117. 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
118. Loti*t, 585 S.El2d at 814; seArizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (holding
"that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve
potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law"); California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 491 (1984) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not require law
enforcement officers to maintain breath samples for possible use at trial).
119. Louir 585 S.E.2d at 814.
120. Id; ser YaovWe' 488 U.S. at 57 (stating that"the Due Process Clause requires a different
result when we deal with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more
can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exoner-
ated the defendant").
121. Loi*, 585 S.E.2d at 815 (quoting Ycw Iff 488 U.S. at 57-58).
122. Id; sw Trram'vta, 467 US. at 485 ("Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, criminal prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fair-
ness.").
123. Laut, 585 S.E2d at 815.
124. Id The court refused to resolve this issue in this case because the court concluded that
Lovitt failed to establish that he could meet the Yaoax4 bad faith standard. Id
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could assert this due process challenge post-trial, the court assumed that the
Y=Vwcdstandard for pre-trial destruction of evidence would applypost-trial."'
In Lovitt's case, the circuit court found no evidence of bad faith on the part
of any official and no evidence of intent to destroy potentially exculpatory
evidence. 1 6 Because the circuit court's findings were based on fact and not law,
they were given deference by the Supreme Court of Virginia."' The Supreme
Court of Virginia stated that the "findings concerning the absence of bad faith
[were] supported bythe evidence and [were] not plainly wrong."'' Further, the
court stated that even if McCarthy was aware that the DNA evidence destroyed
could have been tested again, Lovitt failed to meet the Ycxoodx materiality
standard because Lovitt could only assert a "possibilitythat further testing could
have exculpated him."'29 Additionally, the circuit court found that McCarthywas
unaware of the change in law that was enacted twenty days before the order for
destruction was entered.3'
Lovitt contended that he was "entitled to habeas corpus relief because the
destruction of the trial exhibits violated" sections 19.2-270.4 and 19.2-270.4:1 of
the Virginia Code.' If appeal is taken, section 19.2-270.4(A) allows for the
destruction of exhibits after the appellate remedies are exhausted, subject to the
limitation of section 19.2-270.4:1.2 While section 19.2-270.4:1 requires the
preservation of all biological specimens until judgment is executed, the statute
also accounts for noncompliance by providing that noncompliance" 'shall not
formthe basis for relief in anyhabeas corpus or appellate proceeding.""" Based
on the "unambiguous statutory proscription," the court found no merit in





127. Id at 815-16.
128. Id at 816.
129. Lori 585 S.E.2d at 816.
130. Id The new statute, section 19.2-270.4:1 of the Virginia Code, mandates that human
biological evidence received in the case of a person sentenced to death be stored until execution of
sentence. VA. CODE ANN. S19.2-270.4:1 (Michie Supp. 2003).
131. Lor* 585 SE.2d at 816; sVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-270.4 (Michie Supp. 2003) (mandat-
ing destruction or return of trial exhibits after execution of judgment or, if appeal is taken, after
exhaustion of appelate remedies); VA. CODE ANN. S19.2-270.4:1 (describing standards for the
preservation of biological evidence in felony cases).
132. SwVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-270.4(A) (stating when the trial court mayorder the donation
or destruction of criminal exhibits).




IV. Applia n mo Vgi
A. A dissin fAffida'uts in the Habea Haing
The Supreme Court of Virginia relied on section 19.2-264.4(B) of the
Virginia Code in rejecting Lovitt's assertion "that the affidavits at issue would
have been admissible in the penalty phase proceeding and, thus, should have
been admitted into evidence on that basis at the habeas hearing." '35 Section 19.2-
264.4(B) states in relevant part:
In cases of trial by jury, evidence may be presented as to any matter
which the court deems relevant to sentence, except that reports under
the provisions of 19.2-299, or under any rule of court, shall not be
admtted into evidence.
Evidence which maybe admissible, subject to the rules of evidence
governing admissibility, may include the circumstances surrounding
the offense, the historyand background of the defendant, and any aYtkr
facts in mitigation of the offense. 36
To the extent that Loutt relied on section 19.2-264.4(B) to reject flatly the
admission of hearsayevidence as mitigation in the penaltyphase of a capital trial,
the court erred. 3 ' The question is not whether hearsayevidence must be admit-
ted, but when.' Solely because Lovitt's affidavits were hearsay, they were
excluded. As a consequence of this exclusion the jury was precluded from
hearing relevant mitigating evidence.
B. Wnt fA aual Im mmxe,
A habeas petition is not the proper place to assert a claim of actual inno-
cence. "9 According to section 19.2-327.2, the Supreme Court of Virginia has the
135. Id at 826. The court stated, "Virginia does not permit the admission of such hearsay
evidence during penaltyphase proceedings." Id
136. VA. CODE. ANN §19.2-264.4(B) (Michie Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).
137. Se Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (stating "[tihe excluded [hearsay] testimony
was highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase of the trial," which constituted a
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (stati that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that the sentencer ... not be precluded from considering, as a rnirgfactor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death"); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,110 (1982)
(applying the rule announced in Lodt).
138. QC Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 757, 773 (Va. 1989) (excluding hearsay
testimony in the penalty phase of a capital trial because expert witnesses in criminal cases "must
testify on the basis of their own personal observations or on the basis of evidence adduced at trial").
For a more thorough analysis of the issues presented in Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(B), sW
gamvay Maxwell C Smith, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 615 (2004) (analyzing Brown v. Luebbers,
344 F.3d 770 (8th Cr. 2003)).
139. Sw VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-327.6 (Michie Supp. 2003) (stating "[ain action under this
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authority to issue writs of actual innocence.14 Rule 5.7(B) of the Rules of the
Supreme Court of Virginia permits a petition for a writ of actual innocence based
on unknown or untested scientific evidence so long as the petition is filed within
sixty days of the date the exculpatorytest results were received bythe petitioner
and so long as the petition contains a specific list of items.' 4' If a convicted
capital defendant is successful in obtaining such a writ, "[t]he writ shall lie to the
circuit court that entered the felony conviction." 42
C BradyIssues
The court stated that when a person provides information to the state in
exchange for a reduction or disposition of a criminal charge, this information can
be utilized for impeachment purposes.'43 Citing Cd!rv Dazis,'" the court stated
that when a person does not receive a benefit in exchange for the information he
or she provides, anyprior cooperation cannot be the basis of impeachment and
therefore need not be disclosed as exculpatory.14 This statement seems instinc-
tivelyincorrect. The court's statement appears to reward snitches who tryto aid
the State but fail in their attempt to gain a sentence disposition. By encouraging
these snitches to testifyin subsequent criminal trials, the State gains a snitch who
will try harder to achieve his ultimate goal of a sentence reduction at the expense
of the defendant. These informants should be subject to impeachment just as
those who actually obtain the benefit promised.
D. Vigra CdeSwasic 19.2-270.4 and 19.2-270.4:1
After Lovitt's conviction, but before his habeas appeal, the Virginia General
Assembly passed sections 19.2-270.4. and 19.2-270.4:1 of the Virginia Code.146
In the context of human biological evidence, section 19.2-270.4:1 provides, in
part, that when a defendant is sentenced to death, the Division of Forensic
Science must "store, preserve, and retain such evidence until the judgment is
chapter or the performance of any attorney representing the petitioner under this chapter shall not
form the basis for relief in any habeas corpus or appellate proceeding").
140. See VA. CODE ANN. S19.2-327.2 (Nfichie Supp. 2003) (providing authority for the
Supreme Court of Virginia to issue writs of actual innocence).
141. See VA. Sup. Cr. R. 5:7(B) (stating the rule respecting petitions for a writ of actual
innocence).
142. VA. ODE ANN. S 19.2-327.2.
143. Loumi, 585 S.E2d at 818-19.
144. 301 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2002).
145. Lou, 585 S.E.2d at 819; see Cdier, 301 F.3d at 849 (stating that in the absence of an
agreement or understanding between the prosecution and a witness that the witness's testimonyis
in exchange for leniency, a Brady violation cannot be established).
146. Lou* 585 S.E.2d at 809.
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executed." 4 ' In Lovitt's case, his DNA evidence destruction order was entered
roughly twenty days after the statutory provision took effect.1" The Supreme
Court rejected Lovitt's contention that his sentence must be vacated because
material evidence was destroyed in violation of the applicable statute.'49 Lovitt's
argument failed because section 19.2-270.4:1(E) specifically states that a defen-
dant may not seek habeas relief under this section.' Due to the specific statu-
tory language, it will be impossible for a defendant to gain any sort of habeas
relief from the state's failure to preserve potentially exculpatory biological
evidence. The statute, in effect, pronounces that the Commonwealth finds it
more important that the sentenced offender be killed than for it to be forced to
follow its own laws.
Lovitt also argued that his constitutional due process rights were violated
by the destruction of his trial exhibits and that this violation would prevent"meaningful review of his habeas corpus petition."' The court applied the
Yapaibodbad faith standard for pre-trial destruction of evidence in Lovitt's case,
although the court did not decide the issue of whether a due process claim for
destruction of evidence can be brought in a habeas proceeding."2 Because Lovitt
failed to prove both bad faith on the part of the Commonwealth and that further
testing would have revealed his innocence, the court rejected Lovitt's claim."'
What is ironic about the court's reasoning is that the court relied on
Yacsi' 5 4 Twelve years after the Supreme Court's ruling in Ya&@Vw4 DNA
testing revealed that Youngblood was actuallyinnocent.55 For Youngblood and
defendants in his position, bad faith or not, destruction of potentiallyexculpatory
evidence in light of new forensic tests can and, as was evidenced byYoungblood
himself, should have made a difference in the ultimate guilt/innocence verdict.
V. Ccntdsion
The Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed Lovitt's habeas petition. Among
other issues, this case encourages unconstitutional applications of section 19.2-
264.4(B). Additionally, the case illustrates the improprietyof section 19.2-270.4:1
147. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4:1 (Michie Supp. 2003).
148. Loitt, 585 S.E.2d at 809.
149. Id at 816-17.
150. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-270.4:1('E) (stating, in part, that "[a]n action under this section
or the performance of any attorneyrepresenting the petitioner under this section shall not form the
basis for relief in any habeas corpus or appeflate proceeding").
151. Lot 585 S.E2d at 814.
152. Id at 815.
153. Id at 815-16.
154. Id at 815; Yaiabkx4 488 US. at 51.
155. Barbara Wiitaker, DNA Fne Irmvze Yam After Juatic R46crPIa, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,
2000, at A12, tuiaU/e at 2000 WL 25030459.
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which, in effect, states that the death of a sentenced defendant who claims the
Commonwealth destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence is more important
than forcing the Commonwealth to follow its own laws.
Meghan H. Morgan
